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‘RESPONSIBILITY’ TO PROVIDE: FAMILY 
PROVISION CLAIMS IN VICTORIA 
SAMANTHA RENWICK∗ 
Family provision legislation was introduced in Victoria in 1906 to allow the 
court to order provision from the estate of a deceased person whose will did 
not make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of a 
person for whom the deceased had a moral duty to provide. The first 
version of the legislation allowed only widows and children to claim; it 
underwent little reform until 1997 when a major amendment to the 
Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) removed the statutory list of 
eligible applicants, and replaced it with the jurisdictional question, ‘Did the 
deceased have a responsibility to provide?’ This in theory means that 
‘anyone’ can make a claim, including those without a close family 
relationship with the deceased. This article examines a selection of 
judgments handed down under the new provisions, with the aim of showing 
the range of applicants who are now eligible to apply and examining the 
particular features of their relationship with the deceased that determined 
the success of their claims. This is in light of the current Victorian Law 
Reform Commission Inquiry into Succession Law that questions whether 
eligibility should be limited to certain types of relationship, and whether 
costs should continue to be paid out of the estate.  
I INTRODUCTION 
A family provision claim allows the court to order provision out of the estate 
of a deceased person for the proper maintenance and support of a person for 
whom the deceased had a moral responsibility to provide.1 What is considered 
to be ‘proper’ is relative to all the circumstances of the case.2 The practical 
effect of an order is to alter the provisions of a deceased person’s will or the 
distribution of an estate according to the intestacy provisions of the 
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Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic). This area of law has always been 
controversial, but the position in Victoria is especially so following the major 
reform to the Act in 1997. Under the very first version of the provisions, only 
widows, unmarried daughters under 21 and sons under 18 could claim.3 
Immediately prior to the 1997 reform, only widows, widowers, ex-widows in 
receipt of alimony or maintenance, and children of the deceased were eligible 
to apply.4  
The decision in Rowe v Popple5 is widely considered to have triggered the 
1997 amendment to section 91 of the Act.6 The case examined whether it was 
within the correct construction of the statute to allow step-children to claim as 
‘children’ of the deceased. Nathan J held that the  
word ‘children’ should be given the common meaning it now bears … 
[D]istinctions between children ‘of the blood’ and others are no longer 
adequate to deal with the technological or biological realities of our time. … 
Discrimination against stepchildren who have become children of a 
marriage is not consistent with the remedial purposes of Pt IV.7  
This was overturned on appeal, Brooking J holding that ‘[r]emedial the 
legislation no doubt is, but with all the interpretative benevolence in the world 
one cannot arrive at the contrary result’.8 The practical effect of this result was 
that a step-child who was cared for by the deceased, regarded as the 
deceased’s own child and financially dependent on the deceased, was not 
eligible to claim.  
Following the introduction of no fault divorce with the Family Law Act 1975 
(Cth), there was a subsequent increase in second marriages and step-children. 
Together with the growing number of de facto relationships, the narrow terms 
of the statute led to many cases of injustice in the latter part of the 20th 
century. These facts are recognised in the Second Reading Speeches of the 
Wills Bill 1997 (Vic)9 as leading to the reform. The 1997 reforms removed 
the statutory list of eligible applicants and replaced it with section 91(4)(a), 
which posed a new ‘jurisdictional question’ of whether or not the deceased 
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had a ‘responsibility’ to provide for the applicant.10 Under the new provisions, 
the court is directed to consider a list of factors contained in 
sections 91(4)(e)–(p) in coming to its decision, with family or ‘other 
relationship’ contained in section 91(4)(e). Since, under these provisions, in 
effect ‘anyone’ can claim, questions arise regarding the type of relationship 
between the deceased and the applicant that is required as the basis of a 
successful claim. 
Fourteen years after the reforms were introduced, the Act is again the subject 
of an inquiry — the Inquiry into Succession Law by the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission (‘VLRC’), which questions whether eligibility to apply 
should once again be restricted, and whether all costs of the proceeding 
should continue to be paid out of the estate.11  
This article examines the history of the provisions and the approach the courts 
have taken in deciding claims, before analysing a selection of judgments that 
show the range of applicants who are currently eligible to apply. The concerns 
of the VLRC will then be addressed.  
II THE HISTORY OF THE PROVISIONS 
Family provision originated in New Zealand in 1900 with the Testator’s 
Family Maintenance Act 1900 (NZ). Victoria was the first Australian 
jurisdiction to adopt family provision in the form of the Widows and Young 
Children Maintenance Act 1906 (Vic). Family provision developed as a 
response to men refusing to make testamentary provision for their wives and 
children, following the abolition of ‘dower’ — the legal right of a widow to 
inherit land from the estate of her husband for the purpose of supporting 
herself after his death. Dower had been abolished because it was a legal right 
that attached to the land, rather than being held by the widow personally, and 
as such created conveyancing difficulties for subsequent owners.12 Following 
its abolition, a widow was left with an ‘expectation without right’13 that her 
husband would make appropriate provision.  
New Zealand was a leader in law reform among common law countries during 
the latter part of the 19th century, and introduced many progressive laws in 
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Women in 19th Century New South Wales’ (1998) 11 University Of New South Wales Law 
Journal 133, 148–9. 
13 Ibid 154. 
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response to the agitation for women’s rights. Testators’ family maintenance 
can be seen as an important feminist achievement.14 Lady Anna and Sir 
Robert Stout were the leaders of the movement towards better family 
maintenance in New Zealand. Sir Robert originally sought to introduce a ‘set 
shares’ scheme, whereby dependants of the deceased were entitled to a set 
share of the estate, similar to what exists today in many civil law countries.15 
However, bills introduced by Stout in 1896 and 1897 failed to pass through 
Parliament. Atherton has observed that this was not surprising, given the 
liberal climate in New Zealand in the late 1800s and the attitude that state 
intervention in matters of private property rights was appropriate only on 
‘moral’ grounds.16 The issues raised included whether property was in essence 
an ‘individual right’, or carried with it a social responsibility, that could be 
utilised as an instrument of control.17 Questions also arose in regard to 
whether an individual should be entitled to disinherit dependents, leaving the 
state to support them, and whether the character and conduct of the applicant 
was at all relevant.18 Stout resigned from Parliament in 1898 and became the 
first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, delivering a number 
of judgments that are still cited today, and that provide core family provision 
principles.19  
Robert McNab continued the cause, with one important difference — he 
advocated a shift away from set shares to complete freedom of testation, 
subject to the right of a dependant to apply for an order if that person was left 
without proper provision. This was the polar opposite of Stout’s proposal, but 
it achieved the same object of ensuring provision for those to whom the 
deceased owed a responsibility,20 while also allowing a testator to disinherit 
                                                 
14 Ibid 154–6. 
15 See, eg, Wilbert D Kolkman, ‘Freedom of Testation in the Netherlands’ in Reinhard 
Zimmermann (ed), Freedom of Testation (Mohn Siebeck, 2012) 32–5. The Dutch Civil Code 
provides direct descendants of the deceased with the statutory right to a set share of the estate, 
regardless of what other gifts the descendant may have received. Until 2003, in the 
Netherlands, the ‘statutory heir’ was entitled to an actual share of the estate, but now is 
entitled only to pursue a monetary claim. Kolkman notes that an ‘overwhelming majority’ of 
commentators are of the view that this system is an unjustified restriction of the freedom of 
testation. 
16 Rosalind Atherton, ‘New Zealand’s Testator’s Family Maintenance Act of 1900 — the 
Stouts, the Women’s Movement and Political Compromise’ (1990) 7(2) Otago Law Review 
202, 212. 
17 Rosalind Atherton, ‘The Concept of Moral Duty in the Law of Family Provision — a Gloss 
or Critical Understanding?’ (1999) 5 Australian Journal of Legal History 5, 8. 
18 Atherton, ‘New Zealand’s Testator’s Family Maintenance Act of 1900’, above n 16, 216–7. 
19 See, eg, Allardice v Allardice (1910) 29 NZLR 959 (NZCA); Allen v Manchester [1922] 
NZLR 218 (NZSC). 
20 Atherton, ‘New Zealand’s Testator’s Family Maintenance Act of 1900’, above n 16, 202–15. 
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an applicant of whose character and conduct the testator disapproved.21 This 
has been seen as a ‘brilliant political compromise’,22 and in 1900 the bill that 
would become the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act was finally passed. The 
Act consisted of a single page. It gave the Supreme Court of New Zealand the 
discretion to order such provision out of the estate as it deemed fit, provided 
that the applicants’ character or conduct did not disentitle them. Application 
could be made by the wife, husband or children of the deceased, who had 
been left without ‘adequate’ provision for their ‘proper’ maintenance and 
support.23 No further guidance was given to the court, which therefore had to 
determine the correct application of the Act according to its purpose and 
object.  
Analysing the early cases in New Zealand, Atherton observes that the wording 
of the Act, using two different terms, ‘adequate’ and ‘proper’, implied that 
there must be a difference between them. ‘Adequate’ would seem to be an 
objective, economic test, while ‘proper’ would seem to invite more subjective 
criteria, such as the relative size of the estate, and the lifestyle that the 
deceased had allowed the claimant to become accustomed to.24 Importantly, 
the court only had jurisdiction to provide ‘proper’ provision, not to engage in 
a complete re-write of the will of the testator.25 The task of the court, then, 
was to find the ‘dividing line’ between making proper provision, and 
impinging upon the deceased’s freedom of testation.26 Atherton comes to the 
conclusion that the existence of subjective criteria that directed the court to 
take all the circumstances of the case into account implied that there was 
some sort of ‘moral obligation’ upon individuals to use their freedom of 
testation in a certain way. Adding weight to this idea, the freedom of testation 
at various times has been seen as a means of social control. Under a set shares 
regime, all children of a family will inherit wealth, regardless of the child’s 
effort in life, whereas freedom of testation means that a father may reward his 
hardest working children. This is in turn fosters the economic growth of the 
state.27 It was the abuse of this control that led to the introduction of this 
legislation. The object and purpose of the Act ‘was not merely, or even 
primarily, concerned with relieving the state of the financial burden of 
supporting indigent widows and children. The courts were not empowered 
merely to make such provision for an applicant as would rescue the applicant 
                                                 
21 Ibid 220. 
22 Ibid 214. 
23 Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900 (NZ) s 2. 
24 Atherton, ‘The Concept of Moral Duty in the Law of Family Provision’, above n 17, 10. 
25 Ibid 11–12 citing Allardice v Allardice (1910) 29 NZLR 959, 969. 
26 Atherton, ‘The Concept of Moral Duty in the Law of Family Provision’, above n 17, 12. 
27 Ibid 18–9. 
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from destitution’.28 Rather, the court was given the power to enforce the 
moral duty of the deceased to use the freedom of testation to make ‘adequate 
provision’ for the ‘proper maintenance and support’ of those to whom they 
owed a responsibility.  
III THE APPROACH OF THE COURT 
The first version of the Victorian provisions in the Widows and Young 
Children Maintenance Act were modelled on the New Zealand provisions, 
and the Supreme Court of Victoria has always followed the ‘moral duty’ 
approach developed in the New Zealand Supreme Court.  
Under Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), 
section 91(4) poses what are commonly referred to as the ‘three jurisdictional 
questions’:29 
(1) Whether or not the deceased had a responsibility to make 
provision for the applicant; 
(2) Whether or not the distribution of the estate as effected by the 
deceased’s will, or the operation of the intestacy provisions, or both, 
makes adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of 
the applicant; and 
(3) The amount of provision (if any) which the court may order for 
the applicant. 
In applying all three jurisdictional questions, the court must have regard to 
factors listed in sections 91(4)(e)–(p). These factors include family or other 
relationships; the obligations or responsibilities of the deceased person to the 
applicant or any other person; the size and nature of the estate; the financial 
resources and needs of the applicant; any physical, mental or intellectual 
disability of the applicant; the applicant’s age; any contribution made by the 
applicant to building up the estate, or to the welfare of the deceased, for which 
no adequate consideration was given; any benefits previously given to the 
applicant by the deceased; whether the applicant was being maintained by the 
deceased before that person’s death, and on what basis this responsibility was 
assumed; the liability of any other person to maintain the applicant; the 
character and conduct of the applicant towards the deceased; and any other 
                                                 
28 Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191, 199–200. 
29 Blore v Lang (1960) 104 CLR 124, 128; Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) 
ss 91(4)(a)–(c). 
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matter the court considers relevant. These factors are essentially a codification 
of ‘all the circumstances of the case’ that were considered under the pre-
amendment common law.30 However:  
[s]elf-evidently, such matters [are] of themselves incapable of providing an 
answer to [the jurisdictional questions]. To reason from the matters 
mentioned in [sections 91(4)(e)–(p)] to a conclusion that a testator had a 
responsibility to make provision for a claimant, or that the testator failed to 
make adequate provision for the claimant, necessitate[s] the application of a 
test or standard to the matters to be considered. That test remain[s] one of 
whether and if so what provision a wise and just testator would have 
thought it his moral duty to make in the interests of the claimant.31  
Despite this being long established in succession law, there has been criticism 
from the High Court of Australia regarding the intrusion of the term ‘moral 
duty’ upon the words of the statute.32 However, the High Court reversed its 
position of discouraging reference to the deceased’s ‘moral duty’ in the 2005 
decision in Vigolo v Bostin,33 which is the most recent family provision 
judgment from any jurisdiction.34 In Victoria, there is no uncertainty 
regarding the use of ‘moral duty’ to provide meaning to the words of the 
legislation.35  
In interpreting jurisdictional question one:  
The question to be determined, in the words of the statute, is whether or not 
the deceased had responsibility to make provision for the applicant. That 
must mean a legal or moral responsibility, in the sense in which ‘moral’ has 
been explained in the authorities, for what other kind of responsibility is 
there?36  
                                                 
30 Richard v AXA Trustees Ltd [2000] VSC 341 (1 September 2000) [7]. 
31 Blair v Blair (2004) 10 VR 69, 84 citing Collicoat v McMillan [1999] 3 VR 803, 815. 
32 Coates v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 494, 512–3, 522–3; 
Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134, 
158–60; Goodman v Windeyer (1980) 144 CLR 490, 504–5; Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 
CLR 201, 209. 
33 (2005) 221 CLR 191, 199–200, 204–5 (Gleeson CJ), 203 (Callinan and Heydon JJ); cf 214–7 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
34 See also Ellis v Foley [2009] HCATrans 143 (19 June 2009), an unsuccessful application for 
special leave to appeal from the New South Wales Court of Appeal. Note the exchange 
between Gummow J and counsel for the applicant regarding Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 
CLR 201 and Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191. 
35 Collicoat v McMillan [1999] 3 VR 803, 815–20; Grey v Harrison [1997] 2 VR 359, 361, 
365; Blair v Blair (2004) 10 VR 69, 84. 
36 Lee v Hearn (2005) 11 VR 270, 273. 
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In the course of interpretation of jurisdictional question two:  
It has often been pointed out that very important words in the statute are 
‘adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support’ and that each 
of these words must be given its value. ‘Adequate’ and ‘proper’ in 
particular must be considered as words which must always be relative. The 
‘proper’ maintenance and support of a son claiming a statutory provision 
must be relative to his age, sex, condition and mode of life and situation 
generally. What is ‘adequate’ must be relative not only to his needs but to 
his own capacity and resources for meeting them. There is then a relation to 
be considered between these matters on the one hand, and on the other, the 
nature, extent and character of the estate and the other demands upon it, and 
also what the testator regarded as superior claims or preferable dispositions. 
The words ‘proper maintenance and support’, although they must be treated 
as elastic, cannot be pressed beyond their fair meaning.37  
Adequate provision is something more than bare subsistence — it is not just 
provision ‘for the bread and butter of life, but for a little of the cheese or 
jam’.38 It is ‘something more than a provision to keep the wolf from the door 
— it should at least be sufficient to keep the wolf from pattering round the 
house or lurking in some outhouse in the back yard’.39 Meeting all of the 
applicant’s needs is not necessarily proper, and proper is not necessarily 
defined by reference to the mode of life experienced by the applicant during 
the lifetime of the deceased, whether it was generous or mean.40 The applicant 
does not need to be completely unable to support him- or herself to satisfy 
jurisdictional question two, and the court does not expect applicants to 
exhaust their own resources before being eligible to receive provision.41 On 
the other hand, being left with no provision at all does not automatically lead 
to a finding of the provision being improper.42 Adequate provision for proper 
maintenance and support is relative to all the circumstances of the case.  
In considering jurisdictional question three, ‘[t]he Court is given not only a 
discretion as to the nature and amount of the provision it directs but, what is 
even more important, a discretion as to making a provision at all’.43 That is, 
while an applicant may have established that the deceased had a responsibility 
to provide for the applicant (question one), and that the applicant has been left 
                                                 
37 Pontifical Society for the Propagation of The Faith v Scales (1962) 107 CLR 9, 19 
(Dixon CJ) (‘Pontifical Society’). 
38 Blore v Lang (1960) 104 CLR 124, 135. 
39 King v White [1992] 2 VR 417, 425 citing Re Harris (Deceased) (1936) SASR 497, 501. 
40 Allen v Manchester [1922] NZLR 218, 222; Re Buckland (Deceased) [1966] VR 404, 412–3. 
41 Re Buckland (Deceased) [1966] VR 404, 416. 
42 Allen v Manchester [1922] NZLR 218, 221–2. 
43 Pontifical Society (1962) 107 CLR 9, 19. 
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without adequate provision for his or her proper maintenance and support 
(question two), the court may nevertheless refuse to make an order for 
provision (in responding to question three). This is usually due to the fact that 
another person to whom the deceased owed a ‘responsibility’ has a stronger 
claim, and the estate is not sufficient to fund both. In formulating an order for 
provision, the court approaches the task by asking what provision the 
deceased ‘would have thought it his moral duty to make ... had he been fully 
aware of all the relevant circumstances’,44 and treating the deceased as ‘wise 
and just, rather than a fond and foolish’ testator.45 The court may order only 
that which is adequate to provide proper maintenance and support, and does 
not have a general licence to re-write the will of the deceased in accordance 
with its own ideas of fairness.46 The court may encroach on the deceased’s 
freedom of testation only so far as to fulfil the testator’s moral duty to make 
provision: ‘A breach of moral duty is the justification for curial intervention 
and simultaneously limits its legitimate extent.’47  
In reviewing past cases it is to be observed that courts have established a 
consistent approach. Typically, the court has: stated the moral duty test; 
reminded itself that jurisdiction is restrained by the freedom of testation; then 
set out section 91 in full, using each paragraph of sub-sections (4)(e)–(p) as 
sub-headings under which the judge has stated his or her findings on the 
evidence, before concluding whether the three jurisdictional questions have 
been satisfied, and whether an order should be made.48 Some judges, 
however, have simply stated that they have considered ‘all the circumstances 
of the case’ in accordance with the moral duty of the deceased to make 
adequate provision for proper maintenance and support of those to whom they 
owe a responsibility, before stating what the judge found to be the most 
cogent reasons to grant or refuse an order. Despite the wide variance in 
judgment length (some are only a few pages, others over 100), for each claim, 
a judge must undertake ‘an instinctive synthesis that takes into account all the 
relevant factors and gives them due weight’.49 It is not a scientific or 
arithmetic exercise, and ‘minds may legitimately differ as to the provision 
which should be made’.50 The exercise has been compared to sentencing a 
criminal offender,51 or making an assessment of damages in a personal 
                                                 
44 Allen v Manchester [1922] NZLR 218, 220–1; Allardice v Allardice (1910) 29 NZLR 959, 
972–3. 
45 Bosch v Perpetual Trustees Co (Ltd) [1938] AC 463 (UKPC), 479. 
46 Worladge v Doddridge (1957) 97 CLR 1, 20–1. 
47 Grey v Harrison [1997] 2 VR 359, 366. 
48 See, eg, Scarlett v Scarlett (2012) 7 ASTLR 397. 
49 Grey v Harrison [1997] 2 VR 359, 367.  
50 White v Muldoon [2006] VSC 204 (8 June 2006) [72].  
51 Grey v Harrison [1997] 2 VR 359, 367. 
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injuries case.52 This means that judgments are very fact specific, and there is 
little to be gained from making comparisons of the quantum of orders in 
different cases. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to predict 
the outcome of a claim.  
The next part of the article will examine a selection of judgments that feature 
applicants with different types of relationship to the deceased, with the aim of 
identifying the particular features and nature of relationship required for 
success in each category of claim.  
IV WIDOWS AND WIDOWERS 
In an early case heard under the new provisions, Harper J considered the 
character of a relationship that will give rise to a finding of moral duty to 
provide. Considering the terms of the Statute Law Amendment Relationships 
Act 2001 (Vic) a helpful analogy, Harper J held that:  
Generally speaking … a ‘domestic [relationship] where there is mutual 
commitment to an intimate personal relationship and shared life as a couple, 
irrespective of the gender of each partner’ would be sufficient to bring 
either one of those partners within the class of persons to whom the other 
had responsibility.53  
However, the starting point is not that the court must make a positive finding 
of the existence of a ‘domestic relationship’, as defined in the Relationships 
Act 2008 (Vic).54 There is no requirement that the applicant and deceased 
should have been in a long-term exclusive relationship of mutual support to 
establish ‘responsibility’ to provide.55 Regardless of the status of their 
relationship, if applicants are capable of supporting themselves, then the fact 
that the deceased had assumed responsibility for them in the past will not 
automatically ‘impose an obligation upon … [the] estate to in effect entirely 
support … [them] for the remainder of … [their] life’.56 However, when a 
                                                 
52 Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201, 211.  
53 Schmidt v Watkins [2002] VSC 273 (24 July 2002) [22] quoting Statute Law Amendment 
Relationships Act 2001 (Vic) s 1(2). 
54 Allen v Huntley [2011] VSC 175 (15 April 2011) [75]; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic) s 5: A 
‘registrable domestic relationship’ is ‘[a] relationship ... between two adult persons who are 
not married to each other but are a couple where one or each of the persons in the relationship 
provides personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic nature for the material 
benefit of the other, irrespective of their genders and whether or not they are living under the 
same roof’. 
55 Estrella v McDonald [2012] VSC 62 (26 February 2012). 
56 White v Hannover [2010] VSC 577 (10 December 2010) [77]. 
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moral duty is established, it is ‘generally recognised that a widow [or 
widower] has a higher moral claim on the estate than anybody else’57 and 
‘where the estate is of considerable value, and there are no competing claims 
of children, [it] should not be disposed of in any niggardly manner’.58 
The case of Whitehead v State Trustees Ltd59 provides an example of a 
successful application, where provision was ordered for the partner of the 
deceased and her nine-year-old son. The applicant had fallen pregnant with 
her son before commencing a relationship with the deceased, who encouraged 
her to continue with the pregnancy, and promised to look after both mother 
and child.60 The deceased was an elderly man who had always lived alone, 
and his family did not believe that he was in a relationship with the applicant. 
Despite the fact that the applicant and the deceased did not share a 
conventional husband/wife relationship, and the deceased was not responsible 
for the day to day care of her son, Bell J found that their relationship 
‘represented a social unit which was tantamount to a family’,61 and that the 
deceased’s father–son relationship with the child was an ‘extremely important 
relationship’ for him.62 From the $2.1 million estate, the applicant received a 
legacy of $450 000, and her son received a legacy of $400 000. In affirming 
this decision on appeal, Neave JA held that:  
Family relationships have become increasingly diverse. Changes in the law 
have resulted in ties based on affection, rather than formal legal status, 
receiving greater recognition for a variety of legal purposes. Part IV itself 
recognises that a person may have a moral duty to provide for the 
maintenance and support of another person, even in the absence of a de jure 
marriage or a de facto relationship, or a parent/child relationship. A man 
and a woman [or a same sex couple] may have an emotional commitment to 
each other akin to that of family members, even if they do not live together. 
Such a commitment may exist even though the parties are not financially 
dependent on one another and neither party contributes to the building up of 
the other parties’ [sic] property. The scope of Part IV is not confined to 
those in relationships which do not conform to traditional ideas about 
male/female and parent/child relationships.63 
                                                 
57 King v White [1992] 2 VR 417, 423. 
58 Worladge v Doddridge (1957) 97 CLR 1, 11. 
59 (2011) 4 ASTLR 528.  
60 Ibid 580 [330], affd State Trustees Ltd v Bedford [2012] VSCA 274 (16 November 2012). 
61 Whitehead v State Trustees Ltd (2011) 4 ASTLR 528, 568 [218]. 
62 Ibid 580 [330]. 
63 State Trustees Ltd v Whitehead [2012] VSCA 274 [130]–[131]. 
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An example of an unsuccessful claim is given in the case of Bentley v 
Brennan.64 The deceased was a much older man who had sexually abused the 
applicant throughout his childhood and adolescence, with the relationship 
resuming consensually when the applicant was a young adult. The applicant 
had suffered many mental health problems as a result of the abuse. He later 
married and had children, but the marriage was not successful. Byrne J found 
that the applicant ‘retained a great affection for the deceased but they did not 
enjoy anything like a domestic partnership. It may well be that the older man 
shared his affections with persons other than the plaintiff, and there is no 
evidence as to how he saw the relationship between himself and the 
plaintiff’.65 Byrne J explained,  
I would liken this relationship to be akin to that between a man and a close 
woman friend. I do not refer to the image of a man with a kept mistress or 
even of a man who engaged in intermittent dalliance with a woman; the 
relationship here was based on a close and loving friendship with an 
underlying sexual element which surfaced from time to time.66  
Regarding the abuse, Byrne J pointed to the purpose of the Act and 
commented that while ‘[i]t may be that the general community would applaud 
[a decision of the deceased] to make provision in his will for such a person by 
way of atonement … [the imposition of such a provision] is not the role of 
Part 4 of the Administration and Probate Act’.67  
V INFANT CHILDREN 
There is usually no problem with an infant child or step-child of the deceased 
establishing that the deceased had a responsibility to provide for that child. In 
addition, an adopted child,68 or child conceived with the assistance of 
reproductive technology69 is considered to have the same status as a biological 
child of the deceased, and this factor does not diminish the strength of their 
claim. A foster child who has been raised by the deceased as his or her own 
child, without being legally adopted, has also been successful in making a 
family provision claim.70 However, a practical consideration in other family 
provision claims may be that the needs of the foster child are being met by the 
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child’s new foster carer. This issue arose in a family provision claim by an 
applicant who was the natural child of the deceased, and had been surrendered 
for adoption, although remaining in contact with the parent. While the fact 
that the applicant was the child of the deceased was important, the relevant 
question was the ‘nature’ of the relationship,71 that is, whether it was one in 
which the deceased had a moral duty to provide adequate and proper support, 
in all the circumstances of the case.  
The focus of debate in applications concerning children that go to trial is 
usually the amount of the order for provision, or what financial needs of the 
child it should cover. It may be difficult to estimate the needs of very young 
children when formulating an order, but there is no reason why provision 
cannot be ordered that stretches well into their future.72 The needs of an infant 
child may include being ‘maintained, housed, clothed, fed, educated and … 
provided with reasonable recreation, entertainment and any necessary medical 
care’.73 An example of a generous order is to be found in Whitehead v State 
Trustees Ltd,74 where Bell J made provision for a nine-year-old child, whose 
mother was in a relationship with the deceased, to receive support from the 
estate until he was 18 years old, then a car, payment of tertiary education fees, 
and a deposit on a home. Orders usually do not include an education at a fee-
paying private school, which is properly characterised as a ‘privilege’.75 In 
some circumstances, however, such an education may be appropriate if the 
applicant can establish a special need, for example where the applicant suffers 
from learning difficulties.76 
VI ADULT CHILDREN 
In the very early cases, the court was hesitant to grant the claim of an adult 
son. Stout CJ in Allardice v Allardice commented that ‘[i]f they had any push 
they should, considering their age, have ere this done something for 
themselves, and to settle money on them now might destroy their energy and 
weaken their desire to exert themselves’.77 Conversely, the claims of adult 
daughters, including those who were married, were usually granted. While 
there has been great social change, and the gender of the applicant is no 
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longer a specific factor to be considered,78 the early principles concerning 
adult children provide useful guidance in the modern cases: ‘[w]hile Part IV 
as amended has introduced greater flexibility, it does not represent a radical 
break with the principles recognised in previous authorities.’79 
Fullagar J developed the ‘special need’ or ‘special claim’ approach for claims 
by adult sons: 
No special principle is to be applied in the case of an adult son. But the 
approach of the Court must be different. In the case of a widow or an infant 
child, the Court is dealing with one who is primâ facie dependent on the 
testator and primâ facie has a claim to be maintained and supported. But an 
adult son is, I think, primâ facie able to ‘maintain and support’ himself, and 
some special need or some special claim must, generally speaking, be 
shown to justify intervention by the Court under the Act. (It is perhaps 
necessary to add that in using the word ‘adult’ and the word ‘infant’ I am 
not thinking of a hard and fast boundary line fixed conclusively on the 
attainment of 21 years.)80 
A ‘special need’ or ‘special claim’ may arise in a variety of ways: 
In some cases a special claim may be found to exist because the applicant 
has contributed to building up the testator’s estate or has helped him in 
other ways. In other cases a son who has done nothing for his parents may 
have a special need. This may be because he suffers from some physical or 
mental infirmity, but it is not necessary for an adult son to show that his 
earning powers have been impaired by some disability before he can 
establish a special need for maintenance or support. He may have suffered a 
financial disaster; he may be unable to obtain employment; he may have a 
number of dependants who rely on him for support which he cannot 
adequately provide from his own resources. There are no rigid rules; the 
question whether adequate provision has been made for the proper 
maintenance and support of the adult son must depend on all the 
circumstances — that is, on all the facts that existed at the date of the death 
of the testator, whether the testator knew of them or not, and all the 
eventualities that might at that date reasonably have been foreseen by a 
testator who knew the facts.81  
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A modern application of these principles is found in Anderson v Teboneras.82 
A 22-year-old adult son was found to have a special claim arising from 
working in the deceased’s hairdressing salon without proper remuneration, 
and a special need was established due to his ‘youth, inexperience in business 
and his financial vulnerability as a recently married man’.83 An application 
heard under the current provisions is found in Blair v Blair,84 which 
considered the claim of an able-bodied and self-supporting adult son who had 
received a legacy of $150 000. The defendant was his brother, who had 
received the remainder of the $700 000 estate, which consisted of the family 
farm. Both sons had worked on the farm, but the applicant decided to leave 
and become a vet, establishing his own practice. Harper J ordered provision 
for the applicant on the basis of the disparity in the position of the brothers, 
the defendant being much better placed due to the ‘head start’ in life he had 
been given by his father, while the applicant had received no assistance.85  
While the claims of adult daughters are no longer so readily granted,  
[o]ne should … be cautious about suggesting that because of changes in 
community views, the courts should now be less generous in relation to 
claims by daughters. More often than not claims coming before the courts 
have been brought by middle-aged children against the estates of parents 
who have died in their 60s, 70s or 80s. Many years have passed since those 
children were brought up by their parents, trained for life as best they could 
be and launched into a very different adult world … Consequently, even 30 
to 40 years later when opportunities may appear to be greater and 
expectations certainly are, one is nevertheless still dealing with applications 
such as these, brought by applicants whose lives have been largely moulded 
many years in the past and whose opportunities were, in some senses, 
restricted by that upbringing. Their moral claims and, more importantly, the 
correlative moral obligation of their parents must reflect that background 
and cannot be ignored in ascertaining what is adequate for their proper 
maintenance and support. 86  
An example is given in Woods v Stevenson, Nathan J finding in that case that 
two adult daughters had ‘endured debilitating and unsatisfactory first 
marriages. Both [were] now impoverished and almost without assets’.87 Both 
daughters received an increase in their share of the estate. However, it has 
also been held that an applicant must be able to show that his or her need 
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outweighs that of the other beneficiaries of the estate, who may be the 
applicant’s siblings and in a similar financial situation.88 
A common scenario that leads to claims by adult children is that of the 
applicant having worked in a family business or on a family farm. In 
Anderson v Teboneras,89 the applicant’s claim was supported by the fact that 
he was young and inexperienced in business, and the deceased had made all 
the executive decisions; while in Blair v Blair, the deceased had left virtually 
the entire estate, the family farm, to one beneficiary, while the applicant, his 
brother, had struggled to build his own veterinary practice from scratch. In 
both these cases the applicants were successful. It may also be necessary to 
make a claim due to the practical effect of the provisions of the will on the 
ability to operate the family business. The VLRC has recognised this issue.90 
For example, in Walker v Walker,91 an application for leave to bring a claim 
out of time was made by an adult son who ran the family farm. The deceased 
had divided his parcels of land between all four of his children. The applicant 
successfully argued that ‘the difficulty with these dispositions is that my 
father has thereby made it financially impossible for me to carry on the family 
business’, since it would be necessary for the applicant to buy out his siblings 
in order to facilitate the proper operation of the farm. Another example is 
Vincent v Rae,92 where Hansen J again noted the adverse effect on the 
operation of a farm if the legal ownership of the land were divided up. In 
Torney v Shalders,93 Mandie J held that the deceased had ‘a general obligation 
that arose in all the circumstances, to satisfy, so far as possible, the reasonable 
expectation of [the adult son] to inherit a farming business and a number of 
farming properties upon which to conduct that business’. When claims are 
granted that affect a family business, a judge must take great care that the 
order does not disrupt the continuation of the business,94 for example by 
providing the owner with the option to choose how an order for provision is 
funded out of the estate.  
It is easy to understand the logic behind the claims of adult children who have 
made non-financial contributions to a family business or family farm, or who 
have suffered a ‘disaster’ of some sort, such as the early death of a spouse, 
injury or bankruptcy. It is harder to see why an able-bodied adult child, who is 
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not financially dependent on the deceased and has not been for some time, 
should be granted provision. In fact, actual financial dependency has never 
been the relevant test under the Act. Rather, the test concerns whether a moral 
duty exists to provide for an applicant who is in relative need, according to all 
the circumstances of the case. This may be established if an adult child has a 
high amount of debt, children to provide for, and little in the way of savings, 
with no prospects of being able to build up sufficient superannuation to 
provide for themselves and their dependants into old age. An order for 
provision ‘would make a world of difference to [their] comfort and 
happiness’.95 
VII ADULT STEP-CHILDREN 
In many step-child cases, the relationship between the applicant and the 
deceased tends to be based solely on the relationship between the deceased 
and the child’s natural parent. There is no need to show that there was a 
substitute parent–child relationship between the applicant and the deceased. 
But if an applicant has had little contact with the deceased following the death 
of the applicant’s natural parent, or if the three have never lived together as a 
family unit, then it may be difficult to establish that a moral duty existed.96 If 
the ‘reality of the relationship’ was that the applicant and deceased were ‘in 
effect’ parent and child, then the usual approach for adult children will 
apply.97 
An adult step-child who did not share a close relationship with the deceased 
will often be successful if it can be shown that the deceased’s estate was 
derived from that of the natural parent, who has pre-deceased the testator. 
Nettle J held in McKenzie v Topp98 that  
right thinking members of society are likely to accept that the needs of the 
widow of a second marriage should rank in priority ahead of the claims of 
the [adult] children of a first marriage; although of course it is always a 
question of fact. But equally, upon the death of the widow, and as it were in 
the event of a surplus, most would surely say that the children of the first 
marriage should rank for their fair share. For once the widow is gone, and 
therefore no longer in need of provision, her needs no longer warrant that 
the children rank behind her or thus her chosen successors.  
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Balmford J applied the same reasoning in Keets v Marks,99 and formulated the 
order for provision by reference to the amount that the deceased had inherited 
from his spouse.  
VIII GRANDCHILDREN 
There is generally ‘no moral obligation upon a [grandparent] to make 
provision for the maintenance and support of [a grandchild] simply by virtue 
of the existence of such a relationship. Such a moral obligation will rest upon 
the parents of a grandchild but not the grandparents’.100 The fact that a 
grandparent has made many generous gifts to a grandchild, or has financially 
assisted the child’s parents, will not establish that the grandparent had a 
responsibility to provide. Nor will a promise to pay private school fees 
establish such a responsibility. 
If the deceased grandparent has assumed the parental role, however, this is ‘a 
strong prima facie indicator of a responsibility’.101 An example of a successful 
claim is the case of Subasa v State Trustees Ltd.102 The applicant was the 
‘step-grandson’ of the deceased, whose mother was the daughter of the 
deceased’s second husband. The applicant never knew his father. When the 
applicant was five years old, his mother was placed into psychiatric care, and 
they never re-established a relationship. After living in a number of foster 
homes, he went to live with his grandparents, who treated him like a son. This 
was considered by the court to be a ‘truly exceptional’103 case. Apart from the 
total assumption of care, an important factor in the success of this claim was 
that the defendant beneficiaries of the estate were distant relatives appointed 
under the intestacy provisions, with whom the deceased had no contact after 
migrating to Australia. ‘Neither lived as if a child of the deceased.’104  
In most cases involving the estate of an individual who has grandchildren, it 
may be more appropriate for the parent of the grandchild, being the adult child 
of the deceased, to claim in that person’s own right. As an adult child, the 
applicant may be able to establish responsibility by virtue of the parent–child 
relationship, and relative ‘need’ if the applicant can demonstrate an inability 
to meet all the expenses of raising young children, according to what is 
appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. Examples of relative need 
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might include not being able to afford: a car with enough seats for the whole 
family; fees associated with children’s sport, activities or hobbies; school 
camps and excursions; and a family holiday each year. If the estate is 
sufficient, then a testator has a moral duty to make provision for the parent of 
a grandchild to be able to meet these relative needs.  
IX OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE DECEASED 
Since the amended provisions came into force, there have been claims taken 
to trial by adult siblings of the deceased, nieces and nephews, a cousin and 
adult sons- or daughters-in-law. No data is available regarding claims that 
have settled, or been abandoned, and therefore the number of such claims is 
unclear. This is also the case where family provision claims have been 
brought by more distant relatives. 
There are three approaches that may be utilised in family provision claims 
brought by non-linear family members. The first is to establish that the reality 
of the relationship between applicant and deceased is that of parent and child. 
For example, in Marshall v Spillane,105 the deceased was the eldest sister in a 
family of six, and 21 years older than the applicant, who was her brother. The 
deceased had cared for the applicant since birth, and effectively raised him 
with her husband as their own child. In turn, when the deceased became frail, 
the applicant had cared for her in old age, as a ‘dutiful son’ would have done, 
establishing the responsibility to provide.106  
The second approach is to establish that the applicant has cared for the 
deceased in the way that a child or spouse would, causing ‘great disruption’ to 
the applicant’s own life.107 The applicant taking the deceased into his or her 
own home and caring for the deceased full time might establish this. The 
approach is not available when there is merely a close relationship between 
the two.  
The third possibility is that the wealth of the deceased’s estate has been 
derived from another deceased individual, with whom the applicant had a 
closer relationship. This approach has often been successful in claims by step-
children, where a step-parent has inherited the bulk of the estate in question 
                                                 
105 [2001] VSC 371 (28 September 2001). 
106 Ibid [15]. 
107 McLeod v Troy [2002] VSC 187 (23 May 2002); Troy v Pyers [2002] VSC 188 (23 May 
2002) (judgments delivered concurrently) [17]–[22]; cf James v Day [2004] VSC 290 (17 
August 2004) [38]. 
178 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 1 
from the step-child’s parent.108 It could also cover those situations where the 
estate has passed over another individual, from whom the applicant in due 
course would have inherited. An example is Petrucci v Fields,109 which dealt 
with the claim of an adult daughter-in-law, who was the widow of the 
deceased’s son. An earlier version of the deceased’s will had provided that, if 
any of his children pre-deceased him, their share of his estate would go to 
their children. The deceased later changed his will, as he blamed the applicant 
for his son’s death, which was in fact due to inoperable cancer. Mandie J 
thought that it was appropriate to order provision for the applicant and her 
children in these circumstances.110 A longer bow was drawn in Petersen v 
Micevski,111 which dealt with the claims of two adult sisters to the estates of 
their sister and father, the father having died shortly after his daughter. The 
defendant was the deceased sister’s twin sister. The deceased father and his 
wife had adopted the four women as children. It was proposed that the 
deceased sister had had responsibility to make provision for her siblings, as 
the main asset of her estate was a home, which had been paid for by their 
father and given to her. Theoretically, if their father had pre-deceased their 
sister, or not made this gift to her, then all four children would have shared in 
the estate. Hansen J accepted that this was a relevant consideration, but that it 
was not sufficient to justify an order that the deceased sister’s estate be used 
to provide for her siblings.112 In the overall circumstances of the case, 
Hansen J found that the needs of the defendant were greater than that of the 
applicants, and dismissed the claim.113  
The successful claims of non-linear family members demonstrate the 
importance of the test for eligibility in family provision claims remaining 
discretionary, rather than list-based. Despite the ‘open category’ of possible 
applicants, few claims have been taken to trial by individuals who did not 
have a close relationship with the deceased.  
X FRIENDS AND CARERS 
Perhaps the most controversial type of post-amendment family provision 
claim is that of the caring friend. There has been some confusion in practice 
regarding what type of relationship will lead to the required responsibility 
arising under the Act. A friend of the deceased will not be successful merely 
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because the friend has been living with the deceased, or has been provided 
with financial support,114 especially if ‘the benefit of the arrangement was 
much more significant to the plaintiff than to the deceased’.115 While the fact 
that a person has acted as a carer, and thus contributed to the welfare of the 
deceased, and is a factor that the court is directed to consider under 
section 91(4)(k), that alone does not lead to a moral duty to provide. 
[F]riends, neighbours and even mere acquaintances not infrequently provide 
to another assistance of an extraordinarily generous kind over an 
extraordinarily long period; but neither they, not the recipients of their 
generosity, nor the community, would necessarily or even ordinarily 
conclude that as a result the recipients had a responsibility to make adequate 
provision in their wills for the proper maintenance and support of their 
benefactors. 
To state this conclusion is to draw attention to the object of the legislation. 
It is not to ensure that generosity is adequately rewarded or reciprocated. 
That, generally speaking at least, is a private matter. It is something for the 
individual conscience, not for the necessarily blunt instrument of the law. 
Rather, the object of the legislation is to ensure so far as the law can do it 
that those who have a duty not so much to reward but rather to provide 
maintenance and support do so by appropriate testamentary disposition.116  
The leading example of a successful family provision application is Unger v 
Sanchez.117 The applicant, who was the neighbour of the deceased, based her 
claim upon having cared for the deceased and her husband, and having 
formed a relationship such that the couple regarded her to be their ‘adopted 
daughter’.118 It is very important to note that the deceased did not have any 
children, and the defendant beneficiary of the entire estate was a sister who 
lived in Spain. Kaye J thought that ‘it would only be a rare and quite 
exceptional case which would justify a conclusion that the testator had a 
moral duty to provide for his or her maintenance and support’.119 The 
submissions of the applicant had placed special focus on the fact that her 
relationship with the deceased ‘had a number of characteristics common to the 
relationship of a daughter to her mother’.120 The applicant gave ‘an 
extraordinary degree of devotion and sacrifice … The kind of devotion which 
she gave … was at least equal to, if not well in excess of, the dedication which 
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might be expected of, and given by, an adult child to an ailing and ageing 
parent’.121 While the success of an application does not depend on relationship 
alone, Kaye J referred to the contribution that the applicant had made to the 
welfare of the deceased, and to the fact that ‘[i]n this respect, it is clear that 
the deserts of the plaintiff were particularly strong’.122 The fact that the 
applicant was not related to the deceased made her conduct all the more 
worthy. The applicant received $200 000 from the $1.5 million estate.  
The VLRC has concerns about friends and carers making claims, and asks 
whether the current provisions are allowing speculative claims that executors 
must defend, thus depleting the assets of the estate.  
XI THE VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION INQUIRY 
INTO SUCCESSION LAW 
The VLRC announced in March 2012 that it would be undertaking an inquiry 
into succession law. A series of Consultation Papers,123 along with a Short 
Information Paper on Costs Rules in Succession Proceedings,124 were released 
in December 2012 and the VLRC is to produce a final report by 1 September 
2013. The terms of reference include family provision, wills, intestacy, the 
administration of estates and the regulation of legal practitioners acting as 
executors. The VLRC has been directed to examine whether the law is 
operating ‘justly, fairly and in accordance with community expectations’, and 
to consider the recommendations made by the National Committee for 
Uniform Succession Laws.125 In relation to family provision, the Inquiry 
sought submissions regarding: the factors affecting the settlement of claims; 
the time limits within which a claim must be made; the problems of 
opportunistic claims and the excessive costs that are incurred in responding to 
them; the possible introduction of notional estate provisions in Victoria; what 
the purpose of family provision claims should be; eligibility to claim; whether 
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the costs rules and principles should be amended,126 and whether costs in 
family provision claims are impacting unfairly on estates.127 This article will 
now address the problems associated with costs and the options proposed by 
the VLRC to restrict standing to claim. 
The first option proposed by the VLRC is to implement the proposals of the 
National Committee for Uniform Succession Laws.128 The Uniform 
Succession Laws Project was completed in 2009, but any work regarding the 
implementation of the recommendations in the area of family provision 
appears to be currently on hold.129 To date, its recommendations have only 
been partially implemented in New South Wales in the Succession Act 2006 
(NSW), and Western Australia in the Inheritance (Family and Dependants 
Provision) Amendment Act 2011 (WA). The Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General created the Project in 1991, and a National Committee was 
formed in 1995. The Queensland Law Reform Commission is the co-
ordinating agency, bringing together representatives from the law reform 
commissions of all other Australian jurisdictions. A number of papers have 
been released, including reports on family provision in 1997 and 2004.130 The 
aim of the Project is to create uniform succession laws across Australia, 
thereby easing the administration of estates of deceased persons who owned 
assets in different states.131 
A draft Family Provision Bill 2004 was produced by the Project. Clause 6 
provides that the wife, husband, de facto partner, and ‘non-adult child’ 
(meaning a minor, but not including a step-child) are ‘automatically’ entitled 
to apply. Clause 7 provides that a person to whom the deceased owed a 
responsibility to provide maintenance, education or advancement in life may 
apply to the court for a family provision order. Step-children, adult children, 
and other family members not ‘automatically’ entitled under clause 6 have to 
apply under this section, but there is nothing in the wording of the clause to 
suggest that it is intended to be limited to family members.132 The New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) observed that this clause was 
similar to the Victorian provisions, and that the Victorian Court of Appeal had 
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interpreted ‘responsibility’ to mean ‘moral duty’.133 Clause 10(3)(b)134 
provides that the court may take ‘undisclosed property’ — that is, the 
‘notional estate’ of the deceased, into consideration when formulating an 
order for provision.135 Clause 11 provides a list of matters for the court to 
consider in determining eligibility under clause 7, and whether an order 
should be made.136 The list is quite similar to that contained in sections 
91(4)(e)–(p) of the Administration and Probate Act, but states only that the 
court ‘may’ have regard to those factors, not that it ‘must’ as in the Victorian 
provisions.137 One interesting addition to the list is ‘customary law’ under 
clause 11(2)(m), meaning the customary law of Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander communities, or any other customary law of a community to which 
the deceased person belonged.138 The final factor, ‘any other matter’, is again 
based on the Victorian Administration and Probate Act.139  
Given the similarities between the draft Family Provision Bill 2004 and the 
Administration and Probate Act, it appears that, if the movement to introduce 
uniform succession laws advances, then the main change to the approach in 
Victoria would be that spouses, de facto partners, and minor children would 
be ‘automatically’ eligible to apply, while step-children, adult children, and 
anyone else for whom the deceased had a ‘responsibility’ to provide would 
first need to show standing under clause 7. ‘Responsibility’ would mean 
‘moral duty’, as in the current test. While automatic eligibility to apply may 
seem an attractive feature, this does not translate to an order automatically 
being granted. As can be seen in the Victorian case law, a relationship based 
on blood ties is not enough to ensure that an order is made. The practical 
effect of the section is that an applicant who is a close family member, but 
otherwise would not be able to make out his or her claim, is allowed to skip 
the first jurisdictional question. This could possibly lead to applicants with 
weak claims choosing to proceed to trial under the false belief that 
‘relationship’, rather than responsibility and need, is the most important factor 
in a family provision claim. One of the forces behind the 1997 amendment in 
Victoria was the recognition that the relationships and dependencies that 
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individuals form in contemporary society are not necessarily based on a close 
blood relationship.140  
The ‘notional estate’ provisions also introduce additional uncertainty 
regarding the estate of the deceased person. While in Victoria an order for 
provision can only be made from the assets that the deceased owned at the 
time of death, and after the costs of the administration of the estate and the 
proceedings have been deducted, a ‘notional estate’ brings assets back into the 
estate that the deceased did not have legal title to at the time of death, due to 
inter vivos disposal. Gleeson CJ referred to this as ‘an inherent weakness in 
the scheme of the Act, and its earlier legislative counterparts, as an instrument 
to deal with the mischief at which it is aimed’.141 While the New South Wales 
legislation does contain such a provision,142 the Victorian legislature chose 
not to include it in what was otherwise a very extensive amendment. The 
VLRC agrees that 
In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating the need for such provisions 
to prevent people from depriving their families of provision in Victoria, or 
the effectiveness of such provisions in preventing people from doing this in 
New South Wales, arguably notional estate provisions should not be 
introduced in Victoria.143  
It would therefore appear that the draft Family Provision Bill 2004 
unnecessarily complicates the approach in Victoria, since it has two different 
tests for standing to claim. Furthermore, it has 51 clauses compared to nine in 
Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic). 
The second option proposed by the VLRC is to replace the first jurisdictional 
question concerning whether the deceased had ‘responsibility’ to make 
provision, with the approach taken in the NSW Succession Act.144 
Section 57(1) of that Act provides that an ‘eligible person’ may apply, which 
includes a person who was: the wife or husband of the deceased at the time of 
death; a person with whom the deceased was living in a de facto relationship 
at the time of death; and a child of the deceased. In addition, under the NSW 
Act, the court may make an order if, having regard to all the circumstances of 
the case (whether past or present) there are ‘factors’ which warrant the 
making of an order.145 Such an order can be made on the application of: a 
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former wife or husband; a grandchild, or a person who was a member of the 
household of which the deceased person was a member,146 who was at any 
particular time wholly or partly dependent on the deceased person;147 a former 
wife or husband of the deceased;148 or a person with whom the deceased was 
living in a close personal relationship at the time of death.149 A ‘close personal 
relationship’ is defined as a relationship, other than marriage or a de facto 
relationship, between two adult persons, whether related or not, who are living 
together and one or each of whom provides the other with domestic support 
and personal care. Such care would have to be provided without fee or 
reward, and should not be provided on behalf of another person or 
organisation, such as a government agency, a body corporate or a charitable or 
benevolent organisation.150 If Victoria were to adopt this approach, the VLRC 
asks whether, instead of using the term ‘factors warranting’, the legislation 
should employ a term such as ‘exceptional circumstances’, ‘special 
circumstances’, or ‘some other test’, and whether applicants should be 
required to satisfy this extra step.151  
The third option posed by the VLRC is to keep the Victorian provisions, but 
limit eligibility to applicants who were dependent on the deceased and are in 
financial need.152 While the VLRC notes that these factors are already 
considered under sections 91(4)(h) and 91(4)(m), they are not a ‘prerequisite 
to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction’.153 Given that need has always been a 
relative concept in family provision claims, it is already in fact a prerequisite, 
found in jurisdictional question two. While this option may be effective in 
preventing opportunistic claims, without specifying that the applicant must 
have a certain type of family relationship with the deceased,154 how should 
need be defined? Presumably, it would be defined according to all the 
circumstances of the case, which again is already the current test. The VLRC 
also has concerns that such a provision would encourage ‘bludging’.155 Apart 
from the fact that it is always within an individual’s power to refuse to 
continue supporting someone who truly is ‘bludging’ off them, it is the 
author’s experience that very few laypeople are aware of their rights under 
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family provision law, and even if responsibility and need are established, the 
court may always exercise its discretion at the third stage to refuse to grant an 
order. 
The VLRC has acknowledged that the purpose of the 1997 amendment was to 
address the injustice caused by the previously limited class of persons allowed 
to apply. It recognises that ‘[a]rguably, a return to a strict list approach of this 
nature would risk excluding legitimate claims’.156 The Succession Act 2006 
(NSW) and the draft legislation produced by the Uniform Succession Laws 
Project are significantly longer and more complex than the current Victorian 
provisions, which, despite their apparent flexibility, have produced 
remarkable consistency in the way that judges approach their task of assessing 
claims. In recognising the need for a jurisdictional test, rather than a statutory 
list, to determine standing to claim, the Victorian provisions are far more 
advanced than those in any other jurisdiction and the court can be trusted to 
exercise the wide discretion with care.  
According to the VLRC, the problem leading to the current Inquiry is ‘not that 
provision will be made for undeserving claimants, but that any opportunistic 
claim that is defended or settles results in legal costs that diminish the size of 
the estate’.157 It adds, ‘[t]here is a perception that people make speculative 
claims for family provision in the expectation that their costs will be paid by 
the estate, or that the personal representative will settle the matter to avoid 
incurring costs associated with litigation.’158 The VLRC questions first, the 
practice of costs being paid out of the estate; second, the effectiveness of the 
power to order costs against an applicant if the claim has been made 
frivolously, vexatiously or with no reasonable prospect of success;159 and, 
third, whether summary judgment is an effective way for the court to 
minimise the costs and impact of weak claims, given that family provision is 
highly fact specific, making it difficult for practitioners and the courts to 
confidently evaluate the merits of the case at the summary stage.160  
Succession law in Victoria currently contains an exception to the general rule 
governing costs in civil proceedings. Section 97(6) of the Administration and 
Probate Act 1958 (Vic) provides the court with the discretion to make any 
order for the costs of an application that is, in the court’s opinion, just. If the 
litigation was the deceased’s ‘fault’ (for example, if the deceased failed to 
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properly exercise their freedom of testation), or the proceeding was a 
necessary inquiry into the estate (for example, in matters of questionable 
testamentary capacity), then costs for all parties may be awarded out of the 
estate, usually on a solicitor/client basis.161 The VLRC referred to a Report 
produced by Vines,162 which found that, in many cases, the cost of taking a 
matter to trial is out of ‘proportion’ to the order for provision actually 
received.163 For example, in Collicoat v McMillan164 Ormiston J had to defer 
the payment of costs out of the estate, as any order otherwise would have 
necessitated the sale of the family farm, which was the subject matter of the 
claim — ‘and that would defeat the object of my making further provision’.165  
Vines discovered that far more claims are made in New South Wales (in 
proportion to the number of applications for probate and letters of 
administration), and that costs are far higher. This suggests that the problem 
of cost would not be fixed by limiting eligibility to claim. Rather, Vines 
believes that there is an established ‘culture’ of mediation in Victoria,166 
meaning that parties are less likely to require a trial to resolve their dispute, 
despite section 91(4)(a) seeming to making things more complicated. 
In Victoria, applicants who bring unsuccessful claims that were nevertheless 
not frivolous or vexatious, usually receive their costs from the estate.167 In 
addition, the failure of a claim at the first stage of jurisdiction, due to a finding 
that the deceased did not owe the applicant a moral duty to provide, will not 
automatically lead to costs being ordered against the applicant. Coombes v 
Ward168 is an example. The applicant was an elderly man who had been 
adopted out by the deceased, and he claimed based on this blood relationship. 
His application was dismissed, but McDonald J held that  
there were real questions of fact and law to be determined. The fact that I 
accepted the evidence of the defendant ... in preference to that of the 
plaintiff ... does not mean and it does not follow that the application of the 
                                                 
161 Di Cecco v Contini (No 2) [2004] VSC 243 (25 June 2004) [3]. 
162 VLRC 2013 Family Provision Paper, above n 90, 28–9 [2.61]–[2.64] citing Prue Vines, 
‘Bleak House Revisited? Disproportionality in Family Provision Estate Litigation in New 
South Wales and Victoria’, Research Report (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration) 
2011. 
163 Vines, above n 162, 31. 
164 [1999] 3 VR 803. 
165 Ibid 831–2. 
166 Vines, above n 162, 32; ABC Radio National, ‘Fights Over Wills’, The Law Report, 13 
December 2011 (Damien Carrick and Prue Vines) <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/ 
programs/lawreport/fights-over-wills/3728174>. 
167 Singer v Berghouse (1993) 67 ALJR 708, 709. 
168 [2002] VSC 61 (21 March 2002). 
2013 FAMILY PROVISION CLAIMS IN VICTORIA 187 
plaintiff was made frivolously, vexatiously or with no reasonable prospect 
of success.169  
The applicant appealed the dismissal of his claim, but died while he was 
waiting for it to be heard. His widow continued the claim as his personal 
representative, and the claim was again dismissed. The widow did not have 
costs awarded against her personally, Bongiorno AJA directing that it was 
more appropriate for costs to be paid from the estate of the deceased 
applicant.170  
If the court is satisfied that an application has been made frivolously, 
vexatiously, or despite having no reasonable prospect of success, the court 
may order that the costs of the proceeding be borne by the applicant. In 
Victoria, section 97(7) of the Administration and Probate Act can also be used 
against defendant executors who act unreasonably,171 for example through 
refusing to accept a reasonable offer of settlement. This power was introduced 
in the 1997 amendment to protect estates from a ‘flood’ of opportunistic 
claims, now that ‘anyone’ could claim. The VLRC is concerned that 
section 97(7) is not effective.172 Hewinson v Saul (No 2)173 is one of the few 
cases to explore the application of this section. The applicant was a 44-year-
old businessman claiming from the estate of his 25-year-old ex-girlfriend, 
who died in a car accident. Her only asset was a small life insurance policy, 
which she left to her family. Wodak J held that the claim was ‘hopeless’,174 
and ordered costs against the applicant on an indemnity basis.175 Had Wodak J 
not made this order, it can be imagined that the entire estate of the deceased 
would have been consumed by costs.  
The alternative scenario is where the estate is depleted by costs, due to the 
executor having to defend a weak or speculative claim. It is important to first 
understand that not all unsuccessful claims are inappropriate. For example, it 
may be clear that the deceased did have a responsibility to provide for the 
applicant, and did not make adequate provision, but it may be that there was a 
separate plaintiff or defendant beneficiary who had a more urgent claim, and 
the estate was not sufficient to fund both. While this type of problem would 
ideally be recognised early, and resolved at mediation, there may be enough 
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uncertainty to make it worth going to trial. This is why summary judgment is 
relatively rare in family provision matters.  
An analogy may be drawn with applications for extensions of time to make a 
claim,176 which are readily granted if the case is merely ‘arguable’,177 even 
where there has been a long delay.178 The VLRC is concerned about the 
effectiveness of summary judgment to deal with weak claims at an early 
stage.179 Webb v Ryan180 is an example of a speculative claim that 
successfully avoided summary judgment, and went on to fail, with costs 
ordered against the applicant. In refusing the application for summary 
judgment, Zammit AsJ accepted the plaintiff’s submissions that: it is ‘best’ to 
leave Part IV cases to trial; the claim was unusual; the defendant’s application 
for summary judgment had been made too late; and if the plaintiffs 
completely failed, then the court could use its power under the Act to 
‘recompense’ the estate.181 While the case did raise a factual scenario that had 
not yet been tested under the provisions — concerning a relationship between 
long-term business partners and friends — it took five sitting days, 37 
affidavits and 16 cross-examinations182 to determine that the six plaintiffs had 
failed to establish that the deceased owed them a responsibility.  
Webb v Ryan appears to have been argued on the basis that the applicant’s 
relationship with the deceased ‘was for all practical purposes a family 
relationship’.183 While at one point the financial affairs of the parties had been 
closely intertwined, as one would expect in a family business, the claim 
appears to have been motivated by an agreement of the deceased to bequeath 
to the applicants the proceeds of life insurance policies, in exchange for 
investment in the business.184 Before he died, the deceased paid out the 
applicants, and changed his will to reflect this.185 As the plaintiffs would not 
have been able to make out a claim under contract law, or establish that a trust 
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had arisen in these circumstances, it seems that they turned to family 
provision, hoping that the flexible provisions and wide discretion would work 
in their favour. In ordering a mix of party/party and solicitor/client costs, 
Whelan J commented that ‘the plaintiffs and their advisers were, or ought to 
have been, aware that their claim was unusual and was, on any view, at the 
very margins of what Part IV of the Act provides for’.186  
While the court may be hesitant in granting summary judgment, not many 
applications for summary judgment appear to be made. While parties may be 
unwilling to risk incurring additional costs if an application for summary 
judgment is refused, there are no data available regarding rates of settled or 
abandoned claims, where summary judgment would theoretically have been 
applied for and granted. The overall effectiveness of summary judgment is 
therefore unclear.  
Civil litigation in general is expensive. While it obviously makes sense for the 
successful applicant’s costs, and the executor’s costs of defending a claim, to 
be paid out of the estate, the question becomes more complicated when the 
claim is not frivolous or vexatious, but has a questionable prospect of success. 
It is understandable that the court does not wish to further burden an 
unsuccessful plaintiff, who is already in financial need, with the requirement 
to pay his or her own costs. However, the usual practice in civil litigation is 
that a plaintiff has to weigh this risk against the prospects of success. A 
deceased estate should not be treated as a pool of assets that may be readily 
utilised by anyone who may or may not be found to have an interest in it. The 
practice of all costs being paid out of the estate needs to be re-examined.  
XII CONCLUSION 
Family provision legislation was introduced in New Zealand in 1900, and 
Victoria was the first jurisdiction in Australia to adopt legislation of this kind. 
The aim of family provision legislation is to ensure that an individual uses the 
freedom of testation to make adequate and proper provision for those to whom 
the individual owes a moral responsibility. Under the first version of the 
provisions in Victoria, only widows and children could claim. The legislation 
underwent relatively little reform until a major amendment in 1997, following 
an Inquiry by the VLRC, which found that the narrow terms of the 
Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) were leading to many cases of 
injustice. The 1997 reforms removed the statutory list of eligible applicants 
and replaced it with the jurisdictional question, ‘Did the deceased have a 
responsibility to make provision for the applicant?’ 
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While the 1997 amendment was revolutionary in recognising the necessity of 
a discretion-based approach, the unrestricted category of applicants left the 
estate vulnerable to speculative claims. The court has appeared hesitant to 
utilise its power to order costs against applicants with claims that are 
frivolous, vexatious or have no reasonable prospect of success.  
These factors have led the VLRC to conduct the current Inquiry into 
Succession Law. Among other things, it focuses on who should be eligible to 
make an application for family provision, and whether the costs of all parties 
should be paid from the estate of the deceased, regardless of the success of the 
claim. The VLRC has made a number of suggestions for reform, including the 
implementation of the draft Family Provision Bill 2004 that was developed by 
the National Committee for Uniform Succession Laws; or the adoption of the 
terms of the NSW Succession Act.  
The Inquiry needs to be viewed in light of the previous inquiry, and the 
concerns that led to the 1997 reform. The primary concern was that a 
restricted test for standing to claim was causing injustice in a modern society, 
where individuals form many different types of relationship involving 
responsibility and dependency, which may not be based on blood or legal ties. 
The Victorian provisions are advanced in recognising this, and their simplicity 
is preferable to the options for reform proposed by the current Inquiry.  
Family provision is fact specific, and it can be difficult to predict the outcome 
of a claim. Not all unsuccessful applications can be properly described as 
frivolous or vexatious. However, the usual course of events in litigation is that 
plaintiffs must take the risk of failing, and bear their own costs. The court 
should be more willing to adopt general costs practices in family provision 
claims, to protect the estate for those whom the deceased had responsibility to 
provide.  
